I was really pleased to see this thorough article in the New York Times on Sunday. Reporters at the Times have put together a well researched piece on what many of us have already guessed: The case for war in Iraq was not clear at any point, and was sold to the public by the Executive with rhetoric based on old, misleading and often factually incorrect data. Lies were told at many levels by those who knew that facts told the opposite story that they would eventually relate to the media.
It's amazing to me that these people are so willing to distort facts and opinions to suit their agendas. That discussion, debate and evidentiary standards are annoyances instead of responsibilities. That dissent to their fundamental case for war (the aluminum tubes) was such an inconvenience, even though it was corroborated by expert after expert, that they would choose not to reevaluate sending thousands to their death -- it's devastating to me. Olympia Snowe comments that she, "cannot comprehend the failures in judgment or breakdowns in communication." You can't comprehend them because they aren't failures or breakdowns. Their "judgment" was that they would intentionally deceive the public despite compelling evidence to the contrary. Their "communication" was listening to expert opinions, and turning around and saying the opposite thing. Calling them failures and breakdowns assumes they weren't intentional and calculated, which they were.
I hope more journalists realize their earlier errors of complicity, and start uncovering stories like this.